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Grounding Cyberspeech:
Public Schools' Authority
to Discipline Students for Internet Activity
Sarah 0. Cronan'
INTRODUCTION
N late 2007 people around the world were outraged by the news that
a thirteen-year-old Missouri teen, Megan Meier, hung herself after
receiving hurtful and vicious messages from a sixteen-year-old boy
through a popular social networking site, MySpace.com. 2 Weeks after
Megan's death, Megan's parents found out that the boy did not exist.3 His
profile had been created by the mother of one of Megan's former friends
to "mess with" the young girl.4 Although Megan was targeted by an
adult, she believed she was communicating with another teen.' Megan
was the victim of a phenomenon known as cyberbullying. Cyberbullying
occurs "when a child, preteen or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed,
humiliated, embarrassed or otherwise targeted by another child, preteen
or teen using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies or mobile
phones."6 When an adult is the target of this behavior, it is known as
cyberharassment.7 Over recent years, the occurrence of both cyberbullying
and cyberharassment have increased, often with devastating effects upon
their targets.
Though Megan Meier's story thrust the issue of online harassment into
the national spotlight, concerns over cyberbullying and cyberharassment
are not new. Teens' online activities and their potential for harm have
I J.D. expected 2009, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., Sociology, Indiana
University, 2ooo.The author would like to thank Professor Paul E. Salamanca for his invaluable
editorial comments and guidance.
2 Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. 'IMES, Nov.
28, 2007, at A23 .
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 What is Cyberbulling, Exactly?, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/whatis_
cyberbullyingexactly.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
7 Id.
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received attention from schools, parents, and the media in recent years as
"[t]he explosion of interest in social-networking sites-that make it far
easier for non-technically inclined teens to disseminate material that is
causing emotional harm to other students-is creating many difficulties
for schools as it relates to school climate and the well-being of students.
8
Online harassment has also drawn the attention of health officials and was
the subject of a special issue of the Journal of Adolescent Health sponsored
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2007.' The Journal
of Adolescent Health reported that given the role of such tools as social
networking sites, e-mail, and instant messaging in youth communications,
"educators should be concerned about the issue of electronic media in the
lives of their students" and "should be aware of the effect that violence,
bullying, and harassment can have on children's well being, including
behavior and academic achievement."1
0
The popularity of electronic media is underscored by another recent
study conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life Project which
reported that 93 percent of teens use the Internet, and 64 percent of those
users ages 12 to 17 engage in some form of "content-creating activity"
such as maintaining online journals and personal Web pages.1 One of the
more popular Internet activities among teens is creating profiles on social
networking sites such as MySpace or Facebook. Fifty-five percent of teens
using the Internet are reported to have such profiles."2 These statistics
emphasize the fact that the growing popularity of social networking Internet
sites provides teens with simple resources to create personal Web pages
that can be used for both innocent and mischievous purposes. "Online
teens have access to tools that can gain them widespread attention and
8 David L. Hudson, Student Online Expression: What Do the Internet andMySpace Mean for
Student's First Amendment Rights?, FIRST F. REP. (First Amendment Center, Nashville, Tenn.),
Dec. 19, 2oo6, at z, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/student.internet.speech.pdf;
see also Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies Weapons to WoundFrom Afar, N.Y.TMES, Aug.
z6, 2oo4, at Ai ("Psychologists say the distance between bully and victim on the Internet is
leading to an unprecedented-and often unintentional-degree of brutality, especially when
combined with a typical adolescent's lack of impulse control and underdeveloped empathy
skills. For many teenagers, online harassment has become a part of everyday life ... [oinly
recently has it become pervasive enough that even the adults have started paying attention.");
Jennifer Medina, In Person orin Pixels, It's Still Bullying, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 13, 2005, at 14WC.
9 Studies Suggest Cyber Bullying is on the Rise: Public Health Experts Share Concern Over Online
Harassment and Its Impact on Students, ESCHOOL NEWS, Dec. 4, 2007, http://www.eschoolnews.
com/news/top-news/related-top-news/?i=5o868.
io M.R. Worthen, Education Policy Implications from the Expert Panel on Electronic Media
and Youth Violence, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S6I, S63 (2007).
t I Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and SocialMedia: The Use of SocialMedia Gains a Greater
Foothold in Teen Life as They Embrace the Conversational Nature of Interactive Online Media, TCH.
& MEDIA USE REP. (Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 19, 2007, at i, http://
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeensSocialMedia.Final.pdf.
Iz Id. at ii.
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notoriety-for better or for worse-in ways that simply were not possible
under the traditional mass media model."'3
Although much of the online activity that students engage in occurs
away from school, the most harmful cyberbullying incidents "involve
extensive online harmful actions taken at home that impact school,
because school is where the students are physically together.' 4 Similarly,
when students target teachers or school administrators with disparaging,
defamatory, or threatening comments on the Internet, the effects may be
felt in the classroom. 5 Thus, as student activities on the Internet creep
into the school setting, teachers, school officials, and school boards are
attempting to reach out and address problematic Internet activity. The
schools' actions vary from disciplinary measures against individual students
in response to some specific posting or Internet activity to banning social
networking sites on campus and implementing policies that attempt to
reach students' off-campus Internet activity. 6 Often a school's actions are
met with disapproval from the parents of students and First Amendment
advocates defending students' rights to free speech.
As schools react to student cyberspeech and attempt to hold students
accountable for their online activity, they open themselves to lawsuits
alleging that they have "violat[ed] the students' First Amendment rights,
particularly when the posting is made on an off-campus computer as
most are."' 7  In recent years, lawsuits have been initiated nationwide
related to student cyberbullying and cyberharassment activity "as bullies
move from punching someone on the playground to writing nasty and
sometimes libelous postings about classmates, teachers and school officials
on the Internet, where everyone can read them."'8 These lawsuits are
often initiated by parents of students who have been disciplined because
of their online speech, allegedly in violation of their First Amendment
rights. However, there are also many cases initiated by those who have
been the target of such speech in suits for libel, defamation, and criminal
prosecution.19
13 Id. at i.
14 Nancy E. Willard, The Authority and Responsibility of School Officials in Responding to
Cyberbullying, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S64, S64 (2007).
15 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 852 (Pa. 2002)
(discussing a teacher who was unable to return to school because she was a target of
cyberharassment and three substitute teachers had to be used in her absence).
16 Alan Gomez, Students, Officials Locking Horns Over Blogs, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2006, at
8D.
17 Kelli Kennedy, Not-So-MySpace Any More, LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Apr. 23,
2oo6, available at http://www.theledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2oo6o423/
NEWS/604230392/-l/NEWSo i o. See generally Willard, supra note 14.
18 Kennedy, supra note 17.
19 See, e.g., Anne Broache, Principal Sues Ex-Students Over MySpace Profiles, CNET NEWS.
COM, Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.news.com/Principal+sues+ex-students+over+MySpace+profile
2oo8-2oo9]
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As these lawsuits surface, courts are beginning to examine what has
become a "free-speech debate between school administrators who are
worried about the disruption of the learning process on one hand; and
students, parents and First Amendment advocates who are worried about
whether overzealous school boards are overstepping their bounds on the
other.""0 This debate, though newly emerging in the Internet context,
has existed for decades in the traditional student speech context, and the
Supreme Court has recognized the need for school officials to strike an
appropriate balance between a student's First Amendment rights and a
school's own interest in the "preservation of order and a proper educational
environment.""1
This note will examine the extent to which public schools have
constitutional authority to discipline students for their online Internet
activities, focusing primarily on a school's ability to discipline students
for Internet activity occurring away from school premises that has a
negative impact on the educational process. Specifically, this note will
examine the conflict between public schools' interests in maintaining
order and protecting the health and welfare of its students, and the
students' right to free speech protected by the First Amendment."2
Although the Supreme Court has never heard a case on student Internet
speech, there are a number of lower court decisions that have applied student
speech precedent in the Internet context.2 3 An examination of student
speech jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court's most recent decision
in Morse v. Frederick,14 will show that, because the Internet presents unique
jurisdictional issues, the traditional framework used to analyze student
speech cases produces inconsistent results in cases involving Internet
speech. This note will highlight some of the lower courts' approaches to
student Internet speech cases and will ultimately argue that the standard
to review a purported violation of students' First Amendment rights in
the Internet context should focus less on a geographic distinction, i.e.,
whether the speech occurs in-school or out-of-school, and focus more on
the harmful effects of student cyberbullying and cyberharassment within
schools. Specifically, in the Internet context, an additional exception
s/2100-103o_3-61745o6.html (discussing principal who sued former students for defamation
"claiming they falsely portrayed him as a pot smoker, beer guzzler, and pornography lover and
sullied his reputation through mock MySpace profiles").
2o Gomez, supra note 16.
21 J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,855 (Pa. 2002).
22 See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F3d. 231, 245-246 (4th Cir. j999) (finding that
the First Amendment's protection of free speech is applicable to the states and, in turn, public
schools as state actors, through operation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23 See infra notes 81-13o and accompanying text.
24 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007) (commonly known as "Bong Hits for
Jesus").
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to traditional student speech precedent should be made for student
cyberspeech that, like the drug related speech in Morse, threatens to harm
students and interfere with the educational objectives of the public school
system.
I. STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS-
THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK
The United States Supreme Court first recognized students' right to
free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.5
In Tinker, a group of students planned to express their objections to the
Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school.26 School officials, upon
learning of the students' plan, adopted a policy that any students wearing
such armbands must remove them or face suspension. 7 The students
went forward with their plan and were suspended from school until they
agreed to return without the armbands. z8 The students' parents then
filed a suit asking that the school officials be restrained from disciplining
the students on the grounds that such discipline violated their children's
constitutional right to free speech. 9 The Court noted that the case required
consideration of a central conflict in student speech cases, that is, "the area
where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with
the rules of the school authorities."30 Recognizing this conflict, the Court
noted that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"'" yet also "emphasized the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials ... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."3 Concluding,
however, that the students' plan to wear armbands did not "concern speech
or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students,"33 the Court ultimately held that the school's action in suspending
the students was unconstitutional.34 This conclusion was based on the fact
that there was nothing in the record that "might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in
25 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
26 Id. at 504.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 507.
31 Id. at 506.
32 Id. at 507.
33 Id. at 5o8.
34 Id. at 514.
2008-20091
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fact occurred. 3
Although the Court in Tinkerheld that the school lacked a constitutionally
valid reason to restrict the students' freedom of expression, the decision
acknowledged that student speech is not absolutely protected.3 6 As the
Court noted, "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech."37 This holding is widely known as the Tinker
"substantial disruption" test.31
Three landmark decisions since Tinker have limited the scope of student
First Amendment protection in public schools, creating exceptions and
recognizing circumstances under which student speech can be regulated.
39
These exceptions operate in addition to Tinkers "substantial disruption"
test.4° In Bethel School District v. Fraser," the Court held that a school did
not violate a student's constitutional rights by disciplining him for a sexually
explicit speech made at a school assembly.42 In support of its decision the
Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school
officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
[Fraser's] would undermine the school's basic educational mission. '43 The
Court noted that the discipline in this case was not related to any political
viewpoint, as was the case in Tinker.' The Fraser Court clearly limited
students' First Amendment protection, stating that "the constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.
' '41
Students' free speech rights were limited again in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeiet?6 when the Court affirmed a school's right to exercise
editorial control over a school newspaper published as part of a journalism
class.47 The Court held that the school had not violated the student
35 Id.
36 Id. at 513.
37 Id.
38 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F3d 608, 619 (5 g
h Cir. 2004).
39 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 26o, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
40 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627 (The Court's decisions in Kuhimeier and Fraser confirm
that "the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech.").
41 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675.
42 Id. at 68S.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 682.
46 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
47 Id. at 276.
[Vol. 97
GROUNDING CYBERSPEECH
writers' First Amendment rights by prohibiting publication of an article
that described students' experiences with pregnancy and that contained
"references to sexual activity and birth control. ' 48 The Court wrote that
"[a] school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student
speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use,
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values
of a civilized social order.' 49 As in Fraser, the Court emphasized that
students' First Amendment rights must be balanced against the school's
interest in carrying out its educational mission. 0 Those rights must be
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment"',
and some speech may be subject to regulation by schools if it is "inconsistent
with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school."5"
II. DELINEATING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN
ON-CAMPUS AND OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
A. Morse v. Frederick-Adding a Brick to the Traditional Framework
Despite their distinct holdings, the Supreme Court's First Amendment
decisions that make up the traditional framework for student speech
precedent have at least one factor in common. Whether a display in the
halls, an address at a school assembly, or a column in the newspaper, the
speech or expressive conduct at issue in each case occurred on school
grounds. From 1986 to 2007, lower courts had only the decision in Tinker
and the exceptions announced in Fraserand Kuhlmeieron which to base their
analysis in student speech cases. When Morse v. Frederick3 came before the
Court in 2007 it was the first student speech case in nearly two decades,
and, unlike the cases before it, Morse involved conduct that occurred away
from school premises. Given the dearth of guidance as to the scope of a
school's authority to discipline students for conduct occurring away from
campus, the decision in Morse was highly anticipated by those who sought
clarity in defining the limits of a school's ability to discipline students for
off-campus conduct.5 4
At issue in Morse was whether a teacher violated a student's right to free
48 Id. at 263.
49 Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
50 Id. at 266.
51 Id. at 266. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S 503, 506
(1969)).
52 Id. at 26o. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
53 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. z618 (2007).
54 Bill Mears, High Court Takes "Bong Hits for Jesus" case, CNN.coM, Dec. 1, 2oo6, http://
www.cnn.com/zoo6/LAW/I z/o i/scotus.bonghits/index.html.
2oo8-2oo9]
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speech by confiscating a banner displaying the message "BONG HITS 4
JESUS" at an off-school Olympic torch relay event in JuneauAlaska.55 After
confiscating the banner, the teacher suspended the student for violating a
school policy that prohibited encouragement of illegal drug use.56 In any
student speech case "a threshold issue regarding the 'location' of the speech
must be resolved to determine if the unique concerns regarding the school
environment are even implicated, i.e., is it on-campus speech or purely off-
campus speech?""7 Discipline for student speech that occurs on campus is
subject to review under student speech precedent, the only question being
which of the student speech cases applies in each circumstance. When
student speech occurs away from school, however, as appeared to be case
with the torch relay event in Morse, the scope of a school's disciplinary
authority over students is less clear. In resolving this threshold question,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that,
although Morse's conduct occurred off school premises, it nevertheless
fell within the scope of existing precedent because it took place during a
school authorized activity at which teachers were present.58 Analyzing the
case under the Tinker "substantial disruption" standard, however, the Ninth
Circuit held that disciplining the student for displaying the banner "in the
absence of concern about disruption of educational activities" violated his
First Amendment rights.5 9
The Ninth Circuit's decision to review the case under student speech
precedent was not without criticism, as some believed the case should be
analyzed "simply as speech on a public sidewalk." 6 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that, although the student
was not technically on school grounds when he unfurled his controversial
banner, it was appropriate to analyze the case under student speech
precedent.6' In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that
the conduct occurred across the street from school premises, during school
hours, at an approved school event, and that school policy clearly provided
that rules regarding student conduct pertained to such events.61 With this
decision, the Supreme Court effectively extended the reach of the school's
authority to discipline based on the close connection between the setting
in which the speech occurred and the school itself.
Although it agreed with the Ninth Circuit that student speech precedent
55 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623-24.
56 Id. at 2622-23.
57 J.S. ex re/. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,864 (Pa. zoo2).
58 Morse v. Frederick, 439 E3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd on othergrounds, 127 S.
Ct. z618 (2007).
59 Id. at ix18.
6o Id. at 1[17 (referring to amicus brief submitted by Drug Policy Alliance).
61 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2oo7).
62 Id.
[VOL. 97
GROUNDING CYBERSPEECH
applied, the Supreme Court disagreed that the Tinker "substantial
disruption" test was the appropriate standard by which to analyze the
school's disciplinary action.63 In taking that position, the Court noted that
its decisions in Kuhlmeier and Fraser confirm that "the rule of Tinker is not
the only basis for restricting student speech." 64 Like Fraser and Kuhlmeier
before it, rather than overturning the holding in Tinker, which prohibits
regulation of student speech absent a threat of "substantial disruption,"
6
the Court created yet another exception to Tinker by identifying additional
circumstances under which regulation of student speech is permissible.
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's finding that the school violated the student's
First Amendment rights, the Morse decision provided that "schools may
take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that
can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use" even where
such speech does not pose a threat of substantial disruption. 66 Ultimately,
the narrow holding in the case was no doubt disappointing to many, as it
provided limited guidance with respect to the reach of a school's authority
to discipline students for off-campus conduct.
B. Importance of Determining the Applicability of Student Speech Precedent
In Morse v. Frederick the Court noted that "[t]here is some uncertainty
at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech
precedents but not on these facts. ' 67 Citing the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Porterv. Ascension Parish School Board,68 the Court recognized the confusion
surrounding a school's ability to discipline students for conduct occurring
off-campus. Nevertheless, the Court did not attempt to clarify the scope
of such authority beyond resolving the narrow issue before it.69
An examination of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Porter highlights the
importance of the threshold decision of whether to apply student speech
precedent, and provides a summary of the inconsistent approaches that
have developed with respect to the reach of a school's authority to discipline
students for off-campus conduct.7" Porter involved a student who was
disciplined by his school over a drawing that depicted a "violent siege on
the [school]."71 The drawing was two years old when it was "accidentally
63 Id. at 2627.
64 Id.
65 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
66 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
67 Id. at 2624 (citation omitted).
68 Id.; see Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 E3d 608,615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004).
69 See id. at z6zz.
70 SeePorer, 393 F3d at 619-20.
71 Id. at 61i.
2oo8-2oo9 ]
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taken to school by his younger brother.""2 In reviewing whether the school
violated the student's First Amendment rights and exceeded its authority
to discipline the student on these facts, the Fifth Circuit noted the different
levels of protection afforded to on-campus and off-campus speech.7 3 The
court stated that expressions such as the student's drawing are protected by
the First Amendment, but the drawing would be "entitled to diminished
First Amendment protection when composed by a student on-campus, or
purposefully brought onto a school campus."74 Recognizing the difficulty
in determining when speech is within the school's jurisdiction, the court
stated that "[t]he line dividing fully protected 'off-campus' speech from
less protected 'on-campus' speech is unclear . . . in cases such as this
involving off-campus speech brought on-campus without the knowledge
or permission of the speaker.""7
The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to discuss various approaches that
courts have employed in determining whether to apply student speech
precedent to disciplinary action taken in response to speech that originates
off-campus, but has some connection to the school, such as being brought
on campus by someone other than the speaker.7 6 The Fifth Circuit noted,
however, that once a court finds it is appropriate to evaluate disciplinary
action under student speech precedent, courts "consistently approach
off-campus speech brought on-campus as subject to regulation under
Tinker's 'material and substantial' disruption test. ' 77 Recognizing that not
all courts are willing to apply student speech precedent to speech that
originates off school grounds, the Fifth Circuit stated that some courts
"have found that off-campus speech is entitled to full First Amendment
protection even when it makes its way onto school grounds without the
assistance of the speaker," whereas others have "adopted a combination
approach, analyzing off-campus speech under a flurry of standards in an
effort to comprehensively address all possible legal approaches."78 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit noted that the inconsistencies in the various approaches
employed by courts have led commentators to call for rulings that "more
clearly delineate the boundary line between off-campus speech entitled
to greater First Amendment protection, and on-campus speech subject to
greater regulation. '79
By referring to the Porter case in Morse, the Supreme Court seemed
to recognize the frustration created by these inconsistent approaches to
72 Id.
73 Id. at 618-2o.
74 Id. at 618-i9.
75 Id. at 619.
76 Id. at 619-zo.
77 Id. at 619.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 619-20.
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resolving student speech cases. However, by finding that the torch relay
event where the speech occurred in Morse was essentially an extension
of campus rather than an example of off-campus speech being brought
on-campus,80 the Supreme Court left the question of a school's authority to
impose discipline for speech that originates off-campus open for continued
debate.
III. APPLYING STUDENT SPEECH PRECEDENT IN THE INTERNET CONTEXT
A. Satisfying Tinker-When Is Cyber Speech
Subject to On-Campus Treatment?
Speech that occurs off-campus is not automatically beyond a school's
authority to discipline. Morse supports an argument that when speech is
literally beyond a school's physical boundaries, it may nevertheless have a
sufficient connection to the school to be subject to the school's discipline.
As noted in Porter,8 when off-campus speech is involved, courts may find
that the speech has such great potential for substantial disruption that a
school may regulate it under Tinker. Though Morse and Porter recognize the
difficulty in drawing the line between on-campus and off-campus speech
in purely physical contexts, the question becomes even more difficult
when the speech at issue occurs on the Internet, as such speech is not easy
to classify as occurring on-campus or off-campus .8
The Internet, so to speak, is everywhere. Some speech may originate
off-campus but later be brought on-campus when it is accessed by students
using school Internet resources. Similarly, a child who is being threatened
over the Internet by a peer feels the effect of that speech at school,which may
disrupt the student's education.8 3 "Although much of electronic aggression
is likely perpetrated outside of school hours with personal communication
devices rather than with school technology resources, there is a growing
understanding that these external events negatively affect the functioning
of students at school and the school environment."8 The conflict between
8o See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
81 Seesupra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
82 See Joseph M. Tully, The Outer Limits: Disciplining Students without Getting Sued, in
WESTERN REGIONAL EQurr' NETWORK (University of Arizona ed., 2007), http://www.uacoe.
arizona.edu/wren/publications.html (follow link for document) (discussing the challenges
of determining jurisdiction when conduct occurs-neither at school, nor at home-but in
cyberspace).
83 Anne Marie Chaker, Schools Act to Short-Circuit Spread of "Cyberbullying," WALL ST.
J., Jan. 24, 2007, at Di, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBi 1696o763498685883.html
("If a student is harassed for three hours at night on the Web and they come to school and have
to sit in the same classroom with the student that's the bully, there is an effect on education,
and in that way, there is a direct link to schools.").
84 Carinne David-Ferdon & Marci Feldman Hertz, Electronic Media, Violence, and
2oo8-2oo9]
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a school's interest in maintaining order and a student's right to protection
under the First Amendment is even more pronounced in the Internet
context where schools are operating within uncertain parameters as to their
authority to regulate such speech."5
Courts face a great challenge in determining when an application
of student speech precedent is appropriate in Internet cases and which
Supreme Court decision controls the particular circumstances of the case. 6
As noted in Porter, some courts find that speech originating off-campus
is entitled to full First Amendment protection and does not fall within
the scope of school speech precedent, regardless of whether the speech
ever makes its way onto campus. For example, in Emmett v. Kent School
District,7 the court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the
defendant school district from enforcing a suspension against a student
who was disciplined after posting mock obituaries on his Web site that
"became a topic of discussion at the high school among students, faculty,
and administrators."88 The court found that the speech did not fit within
the scope of Fraser or Kuhimeier, as the speech was neither part of a school
assembly nor connected with a school newspaper.8 9 The court also found
that, although the Web site was directed at the high school and the students
were its intended audience, such direction was not sufficient to warrant
treatment under any student speech precedent, concluding instead that
"the speech was entirely outside of the school's supervision or control."90
By contrast, and as also noted in Porter, other courts have relied on
the Tinker "substantial disruption" test to find a connection between off-
campus speech and the school sufficient to bring the speech within the
scope of the school's disciplinary authority. For example, in J.S. ex rel. H.S.
v. Bethlehem Area SchoolDistrict,91 a student created and posted a Web site on
the Internet from his home computer that "contained derogatory, profane,
offensive and threatening statements directed toward one of the student's
teachers and his principal."92 Although the court noted that "[t]he web
Adolescents: An Emerging Public Health Problem, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S I, S3 (2007).
85 See Kennedy, supra note 17 ("School officials say there's no blueprint to guide them
as they wade through the murky waters of cyberspace."). See generally Willard, supra note 14,
at S64.
86 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2634 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I am
afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools except
when they don't....").
87 Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 E Supp. 2d. io88 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
88 Id. at io89.
89 Id. at 109o.
90 Id.
9 1 J.S. ex rel. H.S.v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
92 Id. at 850-51 (including depictions on the Web site of the teacher as Hitler, a caption
"Why Should She Die," and asking visitors for twenty dollars to contribute toward a hit
man).
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site was compiled on [the student's] own time [and] not created as part of
a school project [or] sponsored by the School District,"93 it also noted that
"[tihe site was not aimed at a random audience but at the specific audience
of students and others in the School District."' In addition, the court
focused on the fact that "the web site created disorder and significantly and
adversely impacted the delivery of instruction"95 as the targeted teacher was
unable to return to school after learning of the site and three substitutes
had to be used in her absence, which disrupted classroom instruction.
96
Ultimately, the court in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District
found a "sufficient nexus between the Web site and the school campus to
consider the speech as occurring on-campus" 97 and held that the school
had not violated the student's rights by disciplining him even though the
speech was initiated entirely off-campus.9 The court held that "where
speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto
the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will
be considered on-campus speech." 99 The court also noted in a footnote
that, although in this particular case the student accessed the site himself
on school property, the possibility of finding on-campus speech was still
viable where a person "posts school-targeted material in a manner known
to be freely accessible from school grounds ... [and] actual accessing by
others in fact occurs, depending upon the totality of the circumstances
involved. ' ' 1o°
In a similarly favorable outcome for schools, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled in Wisniewski v. Board of Education"0 ' that a school did not
violate a student's First Amendment rights by suspending him for sharing,
via the Internet, a depiction suggesting his teacher should be killed. 02 The
expression at issue involved the student's use of America Online's instant
messenger (IM) service from his parent's home computer to communicate
with his friends.0 3 As is common with the instant messaging program, a
user can customize an icon which is then displayed with his or her message
93 Id. at 850.
94 Id. at 869 n.14.
95 Id. at 869.
96 Id. at 852.
97 Id. at 865.
98 Id. at 85o. The court also noted additional connections between the school and the
Web site other than the content and intended audience. Namely, the student who created the
site told other students about the site and showed it to students at school. Id. at 869 n.14.
99 Id. at 865.
ioo Id. at 865 n.I2.
i o i Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 E3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741
(2oo8).
102 Id. at 35.
103 Id.
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when it is sent to other users of the service."° The student's icon, which
resulted in his suspension, "was a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet
at a person's head," above the words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen."' 0 The court
noted that the icon was viewable for three weeks by the student's instant
messaging contacts or "buddies," many of whom were also his classmates,
but it was never sent to the teacher it depicted nor to any other officials at
the school.'°6
In determining what standard should be used to review the case, the
court stated that where a "student's expression [is] reasonably understood
as urging violent conduct, we think the appropriate First Amendment
standard is the one set forth by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District."'' 07 Because of the violent nature of
the icon, the court applied the Tinker standard and stated, "[tihe fact that
[the student's] creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away from
school property does not necessarily insulate him from discipline."'' 0 s In
determining that the speech was not automatically outside of the school's
jurisdiction, the court noted the Supreme Court's decision in Morse, and the
lack of clarification provided therein with respect to the reach of a school's
authority to discipline students for off-campus speech. Specifically, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Since the Supreme Court in Morse rejected the claim that the student's
location, standing across the street from the school at a school approved
event with a banner visible to most students, was not "at school," it had no
occasion to consider the circumstances under which the school authorities
may discipline students for off-campus activities.'09
The court went on to conclude that the "substantial disruption" test
of Tinker was met because "it was reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon
would come to the attention of school authorities and the teacher whom
the icon depicted being shot," and there was "no doubt that the icon, once
made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably
create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment." 110
A United States District Court in Connecticut followed the Wisniewski
104 Id. at 35-36.
105 Id. at 36.
io6 Id.
107 Id. at 38.
io8 Id. at 39.
1o9 Id. at 39 n.3 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2623-24 (2007)) (citations
omitted).
iio Id. at 39-4o (concluding that "foreseeability of both communication to school
authorities, including the teacher, and the risk of substantial disruption is not only reasonable,
but clear").
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decision in Doninger v. Niehoff,"' a case involving a student who posted
a vulgar blog entry on an external Web site that expressed disagreement
with a teacher's decision to cancel a school-sponsored music event."'
The blog was aimed at getting students to e-mail or call the teacher who
cancelled the event to express similar disagreement, and to "'piss her off
more."' As a result of the blog posting, the student was disqualified
from running for senior class secretary because her "conduct in posting the
blog message failed to display the qualities of civility and citizenship the
school expected of class officers and leaders."" 4 The student's mother then
brought suit on her behalf alleging that the disqualification was a violation
of her constitutional rights."' In determining whether student speech
precedent applied to the case, the court took the position that, because
the posting contained "uncivil and offensive communications regarding
school administrators," it was more like Fraser than Tinker. 16 The court
also noted that, unlike the vulgar language of Fraser, the speech at issue
in Doninger was created off-campus but "was purposely designed by [the
student] to come onto the campus."" 7 The court concluded that the blog
posting was "related to school issues, and it was reasonably foreseeable
that other [students at the school] would view the blog and that school
administrators would become aware of it." 118 Thus, following the logic
underlying the Second Circuit's ruling in Wisniewski, the blog constituted
on-campus speech for purposes of First Amendment review.
Though in both Doninger and Wisniewski the student speech occurred
entirely off-campus, both courts found that the connection between the
off-campus speech and the school was sufficient to bring it within the scope
of student speech precedent. However, a significant distinction between
the facts in the two cases is that Wisniewski involved violent expression,
whereas the blog entry in Doninger did not depict or encourage any violent
behavior. Thus, the court in Doninger took the decision in Wisniewski and
fashioned a standard that is even more favorable toward schools in finding
that non-violent off-campus speech related to the school may be considered
on-campus speech for purposes of determining whether disciplinary action
by the school is appropriate.
The decisions in Bethlehem Area School District, Wisniewski, and Doninger
illustrate that some courts are willing to apply student speech precedent
iii Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d I99 (D. Conn. 2007), aff'd, 527 E3d 41 (2d Cir.
2oo8).
112 Id. at 202.
113 Id. at 2o6.
114 Id. at 202.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 216.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 217.
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to speech that originates outside of school where there is a sufficient
connection between that speech and the school, such that the speech is
somehow directed at the school or is intended to have an effect within
the school. As Emmett demonstrates, however, not all courts favor the
school's ability to discipline students for speech that originates off-campus.
Another example of a court refusing to apply student speech precedent to
speech originating away from school is found in Layshock v. Hermitage School
District.1" 9 In Layshock, a student created a parody profile of the school
principal on MySpace.com that contained information about the principal
that was described by the court as nonsensical, silly, crude, and juvenile.2 0
The student used non-school resources during non-school hours to create
the profile on his grandmother's computer.' The court noted that the Web
site did have some connection to the school and that "word of the profile
soon reached most, if not all, of the student body" at the high school.'
The student also "engaged in some limited conduct related to the profile
while in school" by accessing the profile on school premises and showing it
to other students."3 The record further reflected that the principal's profile
was viewed by students at school and that students approached teachers
wanting to discuss the site. 1 4
In analyzing whether the school's actions were appropriate the court
in Layshock recognized that it must "balance the freedom of expression of
a student with the right and responsibility of a public school to maintain
an environment conducive to learning."'2 5 The court stated that the case
raised the issue of a school's ability to discipline a student for speech that
"began with purely out-of-school conduct which subsequently carried
over into the school setting" and discussed the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Morse v. Frederick.1 6 The court concluded that "because the
Justices unanimously agreed that Morse involved school-related speech,
Morse is not controlling of the instant matter."'2 7  Instead, the court
stated that "in cases involving off-campus speech, such as this one, the
school must demonstrate an appropriate nexus" and on "this threshold
jurisdictional question the [c]ourt will not defer to the conclusions of
school administrators."'2 8 Ultimately, applying the Tinker test, the court
found that the student conduct related to the Web profile at school was too
S19 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F Supp. 2d. 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
i 2o Id. at 591.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 592.
125 Id. at 595.
126 Id.
127 Id.
iz8 Id. at 599.
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limited to establish a sufficient nexus between the student's speech and a
disruption within the school environment required to meet the "substantial
disruption" standard. l 9
B. Inconsistent Results in the Internet Context Pose Problems for Schools
Lower courts have relied on Tinker's substantial disruption standard
to determine whether off-campus Internet speech can be subject to on-
campus treatment, but the difficulty of defining what constitutes a sufficient
connection between the student's speech and a substantial disruption
within the school has produced inconsistent results. The analysis in the
cases involving Internet speech seems to turn on the nature and extent
of the connections between the school and the Internet activity, as courts
take into consideration such factors as the following: whether the content
is created or viewed with the use of school resources; whether the subject
matter was brought onto school premises, and by whom; the nature of the
content as political, threatening or benign; and the effect of the content
on school activity and the educational process. The requisite connection
to bring conduct that occurs off-campus within the scope of student
speech precedent and the school's jurisdiction varies from court to court as
illustrated in the cases discussed in the preceding section.
The divergent outcomes in J.S. Bethlehem and Layshock are illustrative
of the uncertainties that abound in the area of student speech on the
Internet. Notably, although the Layshock court recognized that the case
was "on point" with J.S. v. Bethlehem, in which the court found a substantial
disruption sufficient to warrant discipline by the school, the court in
Layshock reached "a slightly different balance between student expression
and school authority" in finding a violation of the student's rights. 30
The inconsistent results and lack of predictability in the law surrounding
student Internet speech is problematic for school officials and administrators.
School officials must either succumb to the fears of litigation and forego
disciplining students, or discipline students and run the risk of facing
litigation in uncertain territory. Because of a lack of guidance as to the scope
of their authority to impose discipline, school officials know that if they
choose the latter, a court may overrule their decision, further undermining
their ability to maintain control within the school environment.
IV. BASIS FOR AN ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO TINKER
PROVIDED BY MORSE V. FREDERICK
The Supreme Court has noted that students' First Amendment
129 Id. at 600.
13o Layshock v Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 E Supp. 2d. 587, 602 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
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protection in schools is "not automatically co-extensive with the rights
of adults in other settings." '31 Looking at First Amendment rights in the
broader context that encompasses speech by all persons, the Court has
recognized a hierarchy of First Amendment protection based on the status
of the speech at issue. 3 Thus, the Court has established limitations on
protection for speech that is obscene, profane, libelous or considered to be
"fighting words," noting that "such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."' 33
The importance of social values as part of education has been a pervasive
subject in student speech precedent. As the Supreme Court stated in Fraser,
"[tihe process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach
by example the shared values of a civilized social order.""3 Although much
of the Internet activity engaged in by students does not rise to the level
of defamation or obscenity, it carries little social value, as teens are using
"e-mails, instant messages and blogs as tools for cruelty, [and] teenagers
are routinely turning to technology as a way to tease, gossip and fight with
each other." 135 Given this state of affairs, such speech should be afforded
lesser levels of protection than other types of student speech such as the
pure political speech protected in Tinker
In addition to stressing that "schools must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized social order,"136 the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of a school's ability to carry out its
educational mission, and the need to balance that interest against students'
First Amendment rights. Specifically, in Kuhimeier the Court stated that
students' First Amendment rights must be "'applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment,"" 37 and noted that some speech
may be subject to regulation by schools if it is "inconsistent with its 'basic
131 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
132 See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758 (1985) ("We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance."); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating the Court
has "afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values"); Chaplinksy v. N.H., 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) ("[Ilt is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances.").
133 Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
134 Fraser 478 U.S. at 683.
135 Jennifer Medina, In Person or in Pixels, It's Still Bullying, N.Y TIMwES, Feb. 13, 2005,
at 14 WC.
136 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
137 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, z66 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
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educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school."' 38
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick, stated that
the Court's decision in Morse "does not endorse the broad argument.., that
the First Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student
speech that interferes with a school's 'educational mission."" 39 Yet, the
Court in Morse held that the pro-drug speech, even in the absence of an
accompanying substantial disruption, was a significant threat to the school's
educational mission to justify the school's right to "take steps to safeguard
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded
as encouraging illegal drug use."'14 The Court's historical emphasis on
the importance of a school's ability to carry out its educational mission
permits an inference that, if student Internet speech presents a risk of
harm comparable to that posed by speech advocating illegal drug use, the
Court could create an additional exception to Tinker. Such an exception
would be consistent with Morse, allowing schools to discipline students for
a category of similarly harmful speech rather than requiring courts to work
within Tinker's "substantial disruption" framework, which has produced
inconsistent results in the Internet context.
The Court in Morse recognized vulnerabilities in school-aged children
relating to drug use, noting that "[s]chool years are the time when the
physical, psychological and addictive effects of drugs are most severe" and
recognizing an "important .. .and perhaps compelling" public interest
in deterring drug use.141 An analogy can be drawn between the harmful
effects of drug use among school-aged children and the harmful effects
of cyberbullying and cyberharassment. This analogy provides justification
for an additional exception placing harmful cyberspeech outside the First
Amendment's protective circle.
Findings from the Journal of Adolescent Health "suggest an emerging
public health issue" as studies "demonstrate an association between
electronic aggression victimization and a range of psychosocial difficulties
and risk factors, including emotional distress, school conduct problems,
weapon-carrying at school, low caregiver-adolescent connectedness and
sexual solicitation."' 14  The harmful effects of cyberbullying have been
established in numerous studies, and there is evidence that online bullying
is even more harmful than face-to-face bullying.143 A New York Times article
138 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted).
139 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 2622 (majority opinion).
141 Id. at 2628.
142 David-Ferdon & Hertz, supra note 84, at S3.
143 See Nancy Willard, Educator's Guide to Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats, CENTER FOR SAFE
AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF THE INTERNET, Apr. 2007, at 5, http://cyberbully.org/cyberbully/docs/
cbcteducator.pdf.
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relaying an interview with an expert on cyberbullying states that "[c]hildren
as young as 7 or 8, who would never have dared to belittle or confront a
classmate face to face, are empowered to be vulgar and vengeful at the
keyboard" and warns that bullying and teasing should not be dismissed
as "common, inescapable features of childhood, because the repercussions
can be serious.''14 A Connecticut paper reported that "[tihe viciousness of
the online attacks and the multiple ways they can be delivered at all hours
of the day and night distinguish cyber-bullying from more traditional forms
of schoolyard bullying, experts say.""'
Electronic resources provide students with "new venues that break
the old boundaries of family, neighborhood, and community that might
have protected our youth to some extent in the past." 146 And because
harmful electronic messages and images "can be distributed quickly to a
wide audience ... interactions that occur in virtual reality can affect the
everyday reality that students experience elsewhere." 147  Studies have
shown that "[t]eenagers harassed online are more likely to skip school, get
into trouble at school and experience emotional stress," and "in extreme
cases, victims may commit suicide or retaliate through violence such as
school shootings." 148 Also, though there is a lesser threat of psychological or
emotional harm to students, allowing cyberharassment of teachers and school
officials to go unchecked carries its own type of harm. Cyberharassment,
like cyberbullying, has great potential to disrupt the educational process
and undermine a school's ability to carry out its "role as a 'principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. ' 149 This research supports a need for schools to address
cyberbullying and cyberharassment, but educators face a difficult dilemma
and are "torn between the desire to stop bad behavior and the limits on
their ability to intervene." 50
Many hoped that the Supreme Court's decision in Morse would provide
much needed guidance to clarify the "'doctrinal fog infecting student
speech jurisprudence,"' as attorney for the Alaska school Kenneth Starr
144 Marcelle S. Fischler, Confronting Bullies Who Wound With Words, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. i6,
2005, § 14, at 4.
145 Colin Poitras, Bullying in Cyberspace. Warning: That Next Instant Message Might Be An
Especially Hurtful One, Sent Anonymously, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 17, 2007, at Ai.
146 L. Rowell Huesmann, The Impact of Electronic Media Violence: Scientific Theory and
Research, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S6 (2007).
147 R.M. Kowalski & S.P. Limber, Electronic Bullying Among Middle School Students, 41 .
ADOLESCENT HEALTH S22, S23 (2007).
148 Poitras, supra note 145.
149 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
15o Chaker, supra note 83.
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put the matter.51 Because of the limited nature of its holding, however,
lower courts have varied widely in their willingness to apply Morse to
student speech cases that do not involve drug-related speech. The Fifth
Circuit interpreted Morse to extend to threats to the student body, holding
that a principal's actions in confiscating and reading a student's diary that
contained threats to carry out a "Columbine-style attack" on the school
did not violate the student's First Amendment rights. 5 In another recent
decision, the Eleventh Circuit extended the Supreme Court's holding in
Morse to validate a school's disciplinary action in response to a student's
threatening story relaying his desire to shoot a teacher."3 Noting the
Supreme Court's opinion in Morse that "'[tihe special characteristics of the
school environment and the governmental interest in stopping student drug
abuse ... allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably
regard as promoting illegal drug use,"' the Eleventh Circuit stated that the
"same rationale applies equally, if not more strongly, to speech reasonably
construed as a threat of school violence."'54
Although it is impossible to know whether these courts' views of the
Supreme Court's holding in Morse will withstand challenge, these early
interpretations, which extend a school's ability to discipline students for
speech beyond the context of illegal drug use, open the door to the possibility
that courts will extend such authority to schools in regulating speech
resulting in the kind of harms that cyberbullying and cyberharassment can
cause.
V. SCHOOLS' RESPONSES-
COMBATING INAPPROPRIATE INTERNET ACTIVITY
In Morse, the Supreme Court stated that schools have an interest in
protecting students "entrusted in their care from the dangers of drug
abuse."'55 The Court cited extensive actions by legislatures and school
boards to combat messages that advocate use of illegal drugs as evidence
of the seriousness of the issue and of the school's legitimate interest in
regulating pro-drug speech.'56 Similarly, the seriousness of the issues
arising out of cyberbullying and cyberharassment are illustrated by
legislative efforts and school policies that have developed in response to
harmful student cyberspeech. For example, in October of 2007, an Indiana
school district passed a policy that subjects students to discipline for online
151 Mears, supra note 54.
152 Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 5o8 F3d. 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007).
153 Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 E3d 978,980-82 (i lth Cir. 2007).
154 Id. at 984 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007)) (quotation and
citation omitted).
155 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).
156 Id.
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activity, warning "'in essence, you blog ... at your own risk."" 7 The policy
"warns students they could be punished for comments they make online,
from home or school."' 58 In Libertyville, Illinois, a high school district
announced it would hold students responsible for their Internet activity,
requiring them to sign a pledge in order to participate in extracurricular
activities "agreeing that evidence of 'illegal or inappropriate' behavior
posted on the Internet could be grounds for disciplinary action." 1 9 The
school district stated that it would not actively search the Internet for
student postings but would monitor activity in response to "a worrisome
tip from another student, a parent or a community member."" 6
Although some schools have acted unilaterally to combat inappropriate
Internet activity, bullying, and the accompanying harms, other schools
have done so at the direction of their state legislature.' 61 An Ohio district
adopted an anti-bullying policy in December of 2007 in response to
state legislation requiring "all public and charter schools to adopt policies
expressly prohibiting bullying and intimidation."' 6  The Ohio school's
policy identifies several forms of harassment, including behavior outside
the classroom and cyberbullying, which is described as "'posting slurs on
social networking sites (or) sending abusive or threatening messages."'' 163
Schools in other states have been empowered by similar legislation.
For instance, Maryland enacted a law in 2008 that requires the State Board
of Education, in consultation with local schools, to develop a "model
policy prohibiting bullying, harassment, or intimidation in schools."'
164
Cyberbullying policies have also been created by educators and state
legislatures in Florida, South Carolina, Utah, and Oregon.' 6 Whether they
are incorporating electronic aggression into existing bullying policies, or
recognizing cyberbullying as a new, separate threat, the policy drafters
are "crafting language that allows educators to intervene even in off-
campus incidents if the activity affects the school environment." 166 The
policy prohibiting speech that advocates use of illegal substances present
in Morse,'67 and the Supreme Court's conclusion that the speech at issue
157 Gomez, supra note i6.
158 Id.
159 Districtto Watch Students on MySpace, MSNBC.coM, May 23, 2006, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/I 2937962.
16o Id.
161 Emanuel Cavallaro, New PolicyTargets School Bullies. Policy to Include Behavior Outside
Classrooms and Cyber-bullying, DAYrON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2007, at ZI-I.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2008).
165 Chaker, supra note 83.
166 Id.
167 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2007).
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in that case was "reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use" ' in
violation of that policy, suggests that implementation of policies prohibiting
cyberbullying may be an important factor in enabling schools to discipline
students for their Internet activities.
CONCLUSION
Despite the negative attention that teens' use of the Internet and social
networking sites attracts, there are proponents of such sites who tout them
as a "great benefit" to children, one that helps "reinforce friendships they
make at school, allows them to discuss homework assignments and enables
them to express their individuality by posting personal profiles .... 169
Though there are certainly benefits to Internet use, the risk to youths
cannot be denied "[als the World Wide Web and traditional communication
technologies blend together in a ubiquitous network with global reach,"
where "verbal and graphic slings and arrows can come from anywhere at
anytime." 7 ' Continued advances in technology and the growing popularity
of the Internet suggest the problems arising out of student Internet
activity and the resulting lawsuits will get worse before getting better. The
predicament faced by schools warrants consideration of a new standard for
determining the scope of administrators' authority to discipline students
for Internet activities, emphasizing schools' interest in maintaining order.
The Supreme Court's consideration of the value of speech as a factor
in the level of protection it should be afforded, along with its opinion in
Morse v. Frederick, provide a basis for removing certain forms of student
speech that can be characterized as cyberbullying or cyberharassment
from First Amendment protection. An argument that such speech should
not be afforded First Amendment protection has support in the Court's
prior student speech precedent as illustrated by its statement in Kuhlmeier
that "[a] school must.., retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student
speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use,
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values
of a civilized social order."' 17 A school's failure to discipline a student for
cyberspeech that may be inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized
social order" is not equivalent to sponsoring such speech. Such failure to
discipline, however, may be mistaken for disinterest on the school's part
and may send an unintended message to students that such conduct is
permissible. Ultimately, inaction has the potential to undermine the
168 Id. at 2629.
169 Dan Fox, Readers Forum; Community Challenge; Adults MustJoin to Stop "Cyberbullying,"
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 1, 2007, at 6A.
17o Tully, supra note 82, at I.
171 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 26o, 272 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
2oo8-2oo9 ]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
school's educational mission and its role in "inculcat[ing] the habits and
manners of civility as values in [students] conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and
the nation."17 1
Discipline for off-campus Internet activity, which has been referred to
by some as "cyberspying," is frowned upon by First Amendment advocates
as critics question the extent of a schools jurisdiction, asking "[w]here does
the school end if you say principals have the right to monitor student activity
on every website?" 173 Of course, if an exception were created that provided
schools with the authority to discipline students for harmful cyberspeech
regardless of its point of origin, a clear definition of the types of speech that
would fall into that category would be required. Considering the rise in
legislative activity regarding cyberbullying and cyberharassment, schools
may have to rely on legislation to provide definitions of specific forms of
speech that constitute bullying or harassment. However, until or unless
there is clarification from the Supreme Court as to the outer boundaries
of a school's authority to discipline speech that occurs away from campus,
schools enacting and enforcing policies that attempt to regulate off-
campus Internet activity will inevitably face litigation challenging the
constitutionality of such policies.
Given the harmful effects of cyberbullying and cyberharassment it is
reasonable to conclude that there is an important and compelling interest in
deterring student online speech that carries little value and great potential
for harm within the nation's public schools. However, until the law catches
up with technology, schools should consider alternatives to discipline such
as preventative educational programs, which attempt to stop cyberbullying
before it begins, and should encourage parents to monitor and understand
the extent and nature of their children's Internet usage.17' Though
education and increased parental involvement will not deter all harmful
cyber activity, such precautions may be the least litigious option until the
appropriate balance between a school's interest in maintaining order by
disciplining students for off-campus Internet activity and the students'
First Amendment right to engage in such activity is fixed by the courts.
172 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD &
MARY R. BEARD, TIE BEARDS' NEW BAsIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (William Beard
ed., rev. ed. 1968)).
173 Kennedy, supra note 17.
174 Willard, supra note 14, at S65; David-Ferdon & Hertz, supra note 84, at S4-S5.
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